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a b s t r a c t
Nowadays network is the preferred governance form to conduct economic transactions.
Network solution allows to reach ﬂexibility maintaining cost and quality level. Since
network concept refers to a great variety of organizational hybrids it is possible to
choose the one that ﬁts better market requirements. The new trends in inter-
organization relationships push towards network solutions: companies are interested
in relationships with partners and customers to overcome resource dependence, to
enter too risky market or simply differentiate their business portfolio. The proposed
research focuses on the network concept aiming at highlighting threats and
opportunities to investigate the double nature of the risk concept. Network structures
offer ﬂexibility and higher proﬁt as a consequence and business risk sharing
opportunity.
These two aspects (proﬁt and risk) are strictly related and have to be considered
together to depict a complete scenario; this implies that risk assessment and
management in network environment cannot neglect proﬁt sharing or, in other words,
that proﬁt sharing mechanisms should use risk as driver. In this context our research
proposes a methodology to measure risk taking into account network peculiarities; risk
estimation is a basic step to evaluate the opportunity cost of capital needed to compute
the network Net Present Value (NPV) that is assumed as base in the proﬁt sharing
process. The proﬁt sharing process has been tackled using the Shapley value approach
that is inspired to the fairness principle while the opportunity cost of capital is assessed
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
& 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Globalisation is a new challenge for ﬁrms and in
particular for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs);
indeed, on the one hand it represents a threat, since new
emerging companies are likely to enter their domestic
market but on the other hand, it offers the opportunity to
enter new emerging and growing markets. In order to win
this challenge ﬁrms can play the networking card; in fact,
it is well acknowledged that networking can improve
ﬁrms’ effectiveness and efﬁciency which is absolutely
necessary to win the globalisation battle.
From Powell’s (1990) seminal work networked organi-
sations have emerged as a new enterprise pattern able to
better match the new competition arena requirements.
From then many papers have addressed hybrids from an
economic point of view (Menard, 2004), from an organi-
sational point of view (Grandori and Soda, 1995), and from
a performance point of view (Mazzarol, 1998). This last
point is of particular interest; indeed, an underlying
assumption concerning networks is that hybrids are
especially good for SMEs. In fact, through networks, SMEs
are able to overcome some of the limitations due to their
size (achieving scale and scope economies coming from
resources pooling) by maintaining the advantages coming
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from being small (reactiveness, proactiveness and so
forth). On the other hand, network solutions imply some
shortcomings: a ﬁrm that decides to link its business to
other ﬁrms accepts a sort of dependence from them. Such
dependence can lead to in opportunistic behaviour and
then the risk of not achieving the desired objectives can
arise. In order to encourage ﬁrms to bear this risk a proper
proﬁt sharing mechanism is needed. Usually, network
solutions allow to achieve a better, but more uncertain,
solution then it needs to estimate the NPV of the project
taking into account either the higher estimated cash ﬂows
both the higher expected rate of return. In literature it is
possible to ﬁnd research on network risk but the problem
is not investigated with a quantitative approach: our aim
is to quantify the network risk. Moreover a fair proﬁt
sharing mechanism should guarantee the partners that
their effort in the cooperation will be rewarded: in order
to do that we propose to use the Shapley value properly
adapted to our settings.
In Section 2 a brief literature review is reported: in
particular Section 2.1 analyzes drivers that push towards
networking and Section 2.2 tackles with the deﬁnition of
risk in network environment; in Section 3 and 4 the
methodologies to measure the network risk and to ﬁx the
proﬁt share for each partner are respectively explained;
Section 5 shows a numerical example aimed at explaining
how to implement the methodologies proposed in the two
previous sections; Section 6 is dedicated to conclusions
and further developments.
2. Literature review
Network solution in organization ﬁeld aims at realizing
coordination among resources belonging to distinguished
companies with the objective of pursuing economic
beneﬁts. The range of organization solutions embraced
in this deﬁnition of network is wide: from supply chain
relationships to strategic joint ventures. The research
paths in this ﬁeld are aimed at answering to the following
questions: what is a network? does it exist a common
background for all the different organization models
included in the network paradigm? what are the recurrent
reasons that push ﬁrms to join a network? how should be
designed a network? which are the parameters involved?
Other questions originate if the risk perspective is
adopted: in network environment how can the risk be
deﬁned? how can it manage? what are the main drivers
for network risk?
2.1. Network organization drivers
Menard (2004) answers to the ﬁrst group of questions:
he analyzes hybrids following the micro-analytical direc-
tion traced out by Coase (1991) and highlights three
headings encapsulated regularities in hybrids: pooling,
contracting and, competing. The choice of a particular
arrangement among the available one essentially depends
on mutual dependence and uncertainty while the govern-
ance model decision involves contractual hazards, reven-
ues sharing and, enforcement issues.
As stated in Hallikas et al. (2004) through networking
companies aim at reducing ﬁnancial and technological
risks improving their competitive advantage through
deeper specialization. Indeed, hybrids seem to exist
because markets are perceived as unable to adequately
bundle the relevant resources and capabilities, while
integration in a hierarchy would reduce ﬂexibility by
creating irreversibility and weakening incentives. On the
other hand, pooling resources in network organisation
allows to keep strong incentives while maintaining
organisation ﬂexibility, specialization creates dependency
on resources belonging to other companies, dependency
increases outcome uncertainty, as a conclusion network-
ing creates additional risks, the so called cooperation risks
(Link and Marxt, 2004).
Harland et al. (2003) locate in product/service com-
plexity the reason of outsourcing which causes changes in
industry structure and, together to e-business, sustains
globalisation. The combined effects of the above men-
tioned phenomena have caused supply network to
become increasingly complex and dynamic characterized
by a complex ﬂow of tangible and intangible features: this
tight interdependency among resources belonging to
different ﬁrms creates a huge amount of compliance
assessment points which are potential sources of risk.
Ojala and Hallikas (2006) deal with the investment
decision making problem in supplier networks consider-
ing the risk as a discriminator to accept or refuse
investment; they match risk investment degree (depend-
ing on investment size and asset speciﬁcity) with the
investment strategic importance to decide if undertake or
not the investment.
These considerations are too often acted as inhibitor
elements in the networking decision while it is necessary
to accompany them with network opportunities in order
to foster networking because of its importance as key
element to compete in the today market.
2.2. Risk in network organization
Risk in networking requires for a dedicated study
because of its peculiarities. Network risk has been the
object of research study: many researchers have classiﬁed
risks originating in network environment and this is a
preparatory step to risk management.
In the academic literature risk is deﬁned as ‘‘the
variance of probability distribution of outcomes’’ (March
and Shapira, 1987). The achievement of a goal in a
network environment depends on partners’ relationship
behaviour as well as objective business environment. This
leads to a multi- dimensional construct for risk because of
multi dimension of factors inﬂuencing outcomes in a
network context. Baird and Thomas (1990) have deﬁned
risk from eight different perspectives: among these
perspectives they mention variability of returns even if
all the other risk characteristics affect, in the short or
long term, ﬁrm ﬁnancial performances. Other authors
are addressed risk characteristics and deﬁnition study
(Shapira, 1995; Yates and Stone, 1992) the emerging issue
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in these researches is that all the characteristics impact on
ﬁrm ﬁnancial results.
Das and Teng (2001) in their work split network risk in
performance and relational risk, indicating the second as
depending on relationship abilities of network partners.
Additional sources of risk in network context are indicated
in Link (2001) and located especially at culture level.
Hallikas et al. (2002) investigate production network
risk and to pursue this issue divide risk in four classes;
their approach is a dyadic approach, that is they assume
the buyer or supplier point of view to assess network risk
and prioritize it. On the contrary, Harland et al. (2003)
propose a supply network risk tool to identify, assess and
manage risk to support the single partner decision making
process concerning network evaluation; they claim they
want to adopt a holistic approach but they envisage that
decisions coming from partners could not agree and give
rise to destabilizing of the network at some point. Link
and Marxt (2004) besides assuming a holistic and
systematic approach, integrate risk and chance sharing
using chance to counterbalance risk assumption. In order
to handle correctly risk its positive side has to be taken
into account: more risky activities can be considered
suitable depending on their proﬁtability (it depends on
decisor making risk aversion).
Usually to evaluate networking convenience a static
perspective is assumed: economic theories are based on
cost-based considerations neglecting the evolutionary
side of networking or its long term consequences
(immaterial factors that can cause ﬁnancial losses in the
long run hard to convert into monetary value (Hallikas et
al., 2004)).
To overcome this limitation Das and Teng (2001) take
into account risk consideration in an early phase of
network constitution: they suggest a risk perception
model to drive alliance structure choice that include
several risk antecedents (psychological traits such as trust
propensity, locus of control, future orientation and
situational factors such as alliance history, partner
asymmetries, shared R&D efforts). In a previous paper
(Das and Teng, 1996) they classify network risk in
relational and performance risk. In their classiﬁcation
relational risk concerns the probability and consequences
that a partner does not commit to the alliance in the
agreed manner. Performance risk refers to those factors
that may jeopardize the achievement of strategic objec-
tives, given that the partners cooperate fully. They
consider independent the two type of risk and propose
to ﬁt the best network governance depending on the
amount of relational and performance risk forecasted. In
particular they classify network in equity (joint ventures
and minority equity network) and non-equity network
(one and bilateral contract) investigating the ability of
each structure to tackle with relational and performance
network. In fact, as emerged in Yoshino and Rangan
(1995) study managers believe that success or failure of
alliances hinge on their structures, moreover, they ﬁnd
that different partners in the same industry choose
different alliance structure for the same purpose; then
alliance structure is not mandatory based on alliance
strategic scope.
The literature analysis (Link, 2001) seems to conclude
that when the networking is chosen to run a business the
consequent risk is higher than the risk related to the same
business run by a single company, even if resource
dependence theory suggests strategic alliance to share
risk and networking is a tool to enter too risky market. If
networking assures a higher rate of investment return in
fact the risk is supposed to be higher, otherwise this
conclusion is not obvious and risk deﬁnition would need a
deeper investigation.
In his research Zsidisin (2003) ﬁnds out that compa-
nies deﬁne supply risk taking into account direct losses as
well as opportunity cost. As a consequence ﬁrm should
formulate its alternatives to networking to evaluate if risk
rise is acceptable or not; in Lo Nigro et al. (2007) authors
consider discarded alternatives in order to properly
formulate opportunity cost and deﬁne partner risk.
As already mentioned, Das and Teng (2001) distinguish
performance risk and relational risk as components of
network risk. Single ﬁrm effort and interﬁrm cooperation
are alternative ways to carry out a project. A shared
performance risk via an alliance will usually be lower than
the performance risk of a project carried out by one ﬁrm.
By pooling resources of several specialised ﬁrms the
likelihood of success is enhanced. In as much, as the
partners have contended with performance risk of a
project, strategic alliances constitute an effective way to
control that performance risk. Then it is useful to split also
performance risk as deﬁned in Das and Teng (2001)
between performance risk as the risk incurred by a single
ﬁrm carrying out a project and a network performance
risk referred to the network risk when the partners
cooperate fully (Lo Nigro et al., 2007). When the network
solution is embraced relational risk occurs. As explained
in Lo Nigro et al. (2007), risk is modiﬁed shifting from a
single ﬁrm conducting the business to a network
performing the same business; it is possible to model
risk escalation as sum up of contribution from network
performance risk and network relational risk.
Relational risk is related to lack of trust, inaccurate
information sharing and asymmetry in reciprocal position
that causes dependency (a partner acts as captive in the
relationship) (Ojala and Hallikas, 2006).
Smallman’s categorization of direct and indirect risks
(Smallman, 1996) is helpful in the considered environ-
ment because it is worthwhile to be aware that risk may
be partly inﬂuenced by an organization and individuals
within it and partly by events beyond their inﬂuence. In
this context risk can be categorised in direct and indirect
referring to the network inﬂuence in their occurrence.
Hence certain amount of network risk is inherent the
business while the complementary part is related to
networking choice.
Combining Das and Teng (2001) classiﬁcation with
Smallman (1996) categorization using network as risk
object, Lo Nigro et al. (2007) analyse risk basing on risk
decomposition as shown in Fig. 1.
In order to clarify the proposed risk decomposition, it
can be observed that network risk can be considered the
combination of relational and performance risk: perfor-
mance risk can be explained by taking into account both
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objective business conditions (indirect performance risk)
and network behaviour (direct performance risk). Indirect
performance risk is the part of network risk not depen-
dent on network characteristics, a systematic risk, while
direct risk are directly related to network solution then it
is an unsystematic or speciﬁc risk. It is worthwhile to
observe that direct risk contribution could reduce perfor-
mance risk.
Our research starts from this decomposition to quanti-
tatively estimate network risk and the rate of return of
network project useful to deﬁne a fair revenue for each
participant.
Risk management basically follows two strategies:
individuate actions to ﬁght risk consequences and try to
reduce a priori risk sources. The mandatory stage in both
cases consists in risk evaluation. Most companies develop
plans to protect against recurrent, low-impact risks
(operational risk) in their supply chains; many, however,
ignore high-impact, low-likelihood risks (disruptive risk).
We aim to support risk manager in checking the effects
of his decisions on operational and disruptive risk or
alternatively in evaluating network risk in the assessment
step of his work.
3. Measure the risk in business network
In order to manage risk it is helpful to ﬁnd out its
sources. Hallikas et al. (2006) individuate in asset
speciﬁcity, market inefﬁciency, knowledge appropriability
and timing misalignment among partners the risk
sources.
Spekman et al. (2002) state that the same uncertainty
that pushes ﬁrms to cooperate also offers partners a
chance to behave opportunistically.
Ring and Van de Ven (1992) identify two distinct sets
of uncertainty in strategic alliances: uncertainty regarding
future states of nature and uncertainty whether partners
will be able to rely on trust. In this classiﬁcation it is not
considered uncertainty regarding the alliance ability to
cope with the unpredictable events. In alliances devoted
to complex environment contracts cannot cover all the
possible states of nature then it should behold how to face
with unforeseen events.
In contrast with the dyadic approach that focuses on
focal ﬁrm to assess the risk but, as main drawback, it can
ﬁnd out a non optimal solution for the network, it is
possible to measure risk considering the network per-
spective. This does not mean neglect network peculia-
rities; that is the risk assessment has to take into account
network competencies.
This research focuses its attention on risk measured by
expected results variability.
In the network environment it seems easier and also
more useful to manage it to deﬁne the global network risk
than to deﬁne the risk borne by each partner.
The problem of network risk estimation has been
treated in literature in a qualitative form; it is possible to
ﬁnd out drivers that affect positively the risk (the risk
increases) and drivers that affect the risk in the opposite
sense. In the other hand the quantitative estimation does
not receive particular attention, even if the qualitative
ﬁndings can support the quantitative approach.
Our aim is to estimate risk as variability in the
expected results; in the corporate ﬁnance area project
with higher variability in expected cash ﬂows are required
a higher rate of return of capital.
In the ﬁnance ﬁeld the cost of capital or rate of return
is estimated using various models; the most used is the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964). The
CAPM is an equilibrium theory based on the theory of
portfolio selection. In the present application CAPM is
used to estimate the cost of capital for the network
investment.
The CAPM formulation is shown below:
ri ¼ rrf þ bi  ðrm  rrf Þ ð1Þ
where ri is the rate of return for a generic stock i; rrf is the
rate of return of the risk free investment; rm is the rate of
return for the market; bi is the sensibility to stock i to
market trends.
For the aim of our research i represents the considered
network (N) and to estimate rN it needs bN (the CAPM b
factor for the network N).
Managing network risk is difﬁcult because risk com-
ponents are often interconnected. As a result, actions that
mitigate one risk component can end up exacerbating
another (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004); risk decomposition
could help to properly evaluate the effect of hedging
solution on each part of it and then avoid their
overestimation.
Let us indicate with bI the CAPM b factor for the
industry to which the considered network N belongs to;
this factor takes into consideration the indirect perfor-
mance network risk because considers the sources of risk
that do not depend on network arrangement.
Basing on the risk decomposition shown in Fig. 1 that
identiﬁes three network risk components. We estimate bN
with a bottom up procedure. In fact, bN can be estimated
by bI if we are able to quantify the effect that direct
network risk should have on bI. In the adopted decom-
position model for the network risk, direct risk is
articulated in relational and performance direct risk. We
propose to estimate bN by a levering/unlevering process
on bI through two bs parameters related to relational (bR)
and performance (bP) network direct risk.
bN ¼ bI  bR  bP ð2Þ
Fig. 1. Network risk decomposition (Lo Nigro et al., 2007).
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Relational risk refers to the variability induced in
network performance when partners do not respect
commitments; literature suggestions reported in Section
2 led to conclude that this may happen when potential
opportunism is high, relational uncertainty is high
(incomplete contract because of unpredictable events)
and trust (previous experience) and reputation impor-
tance are low.
Table 1 shows the sub-factor for bR; the second column
shows the source of risk for the factor indicated in the ﬁrst
column, while the third column states the correlation
between the source level and bR, e.g. if the potential
opportunism is high bR1 is also high. Each sub-factor can be
expressed in a l-point Likert scale (ranging in the interval
½1 l) that measures the degree of truth of the related
statement (Table 2) and bR can be calculated as follows:
bR ¼ t
3  l
X3
i¼1
bRi ð3Þ
where l is the upper bound for the Likert scale adopted
and t is a threshold greater than one that expresses the
sensitivity of bN to bR that depends on industry
characteristics and represents the value of bR when all
bRi are equal to their maximum value (l).
Therefore the effect of bR on bN can vary from a neutral
one (bR=1) to a levering one (bR=t).
Direct performance risk considers variability originates
because of network adoption and in case of perfect
commitment. Usually the effect of bP on bN is a mitigating
or unlevering one, then bP varies in the range ½0 1
(lower values of bP mean that network is able to strongly
reduce risk, bP=1 means that network plays a neutral role
on the total performance risk).
According to risk deﬁnition an effective risk manage-
ment is empowered by the ability to face with changes, i.e.
to be ﬂexible (ﬂexibility is the capacity to react or pro-act
to change). One of the most acknowledged beneﬁts of
networking is the possibility to maintain an agile
structure competing in challenging markets. Teece et al.
(1997) deﬁne dynamic capabilities as the ﬁrm’s ability to
integrate, build and reconﬁgure internal and external
competencies to address rapidly changing environments.
Then networks seem to guarantee a higher level of
ﬂexibility respect a single company able to compete like
the network; this ﬂexibility allows the network to reduce
its results variability then we can guess that bP has a
mitigating effect on bI.
In order to estimate bP we adopt the Supply Chain
Management perspective proposed by Tang (2006) even if
a network is a broader concept. Tang proposes four basic
approaches to mitigate the impact of supply chain risks:
network should coordinates transaction with upstream
(supplier) and downstream (customer) partners to obtain
an efﬁcient supply of input of any nature and to inﬂuence
demand in a favourable manner, moreover network could
intervene in product characteristics to exploit partner
speciﬁcity and to make easier market requirement
accomplishment, ﬁnally network should manage partner
private information in order to achieve a competitive
advantage (Fig. 2).
Therefore bP can be split in four sub-factors and each of
them has a related statement (Table 3); the degree of truth
Table 1
bR sub-factors.
Factor Source Effect on bR
bR1 Potential opportunism positive
bR2 Relational uncertainty positive
bR3 Trust and reputation importance negative
Table 2
bR sub-factors assessment.
Factor Statement Range
bR1 Potential opportunism is high in the network [1l]
bR2 Relational uncertainty is high in the network [1l]
bR3 Trust and reputation is not important at all in the
network
[1l]
Fig. 2. Approaches for managing network direct performance risk (Tang, 2006).
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of each statement can be expressed in the range ½0 1
(1 if the statement is true).
To calculate bP Eq. (4) can be used
bP ¼ 1
4
X4
i¼1
bPi ð4Þ
Finally using Eq. (2), bN can be estimated and Eq. (1)
allows calculating rN.
4. Proﬁt share in business network
The proﬁt sharing mechanism should be based on
equality principles; each partner should be aware that the
received proﬁt is commeasured to the effort made for the
collaboration. Shapley value (Shapley and Shubik, 1954)
has already been used to fulﬁl such kind of requirements
(Lo Nigro et al., 2005). The Shapley value aims at
measuring the contribution value of a participant in a
collaborative group through the mean value added to the
group.
According to Lamming (1993) value analysis and value
creating potential exploration of different phases in the
network history should drive network establishment; in
his work Lamming addresses supply chain relationship
and states that long term relationship main driver should
be added value of supplier than reducing purchasing
costs. Generalizing Lamming proposition it can be
afﬁrmed that network constitution main drivers should
have a long term orientation (taking into account network
evolution opportunities) rather than pursue just risk
reduction.
Network value embracing a long term perspective can
be evaluated through its NPV; to do that cash ﬂows and
cost of capital have to be estimated.
In the game theory ﬁeld it is desirable to have a
solution concept for cooperative games that results in a
unique outcome and hence has a reasonable predictive
power (as the Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative
games). Shapley (Tang, 2006) offers an axiomatic ap-
proach to the solution concept that is based on three quite
intuitive axioms. First, the value of the player should not
change due to permutations of players, i.e. only the role of
the player matters and not names or indices assigned to
players. Second, if a player’s added value to the coalition is
zero then this player should not get any proﬁt from the
coalition, or in other words only players generating added
value should share the beneﬁts. Finally, the third axiom
requires additivity of payoffs.
The surprising result obtained by Shapley is that there
is a unique equilibrium payoff (called the Shapley value)
that satisﬁes all three axioms.
There is only one payoff function p for a characteristic
function n that satisﬁes the three axioms. It is deﬁned by
the following expressions for 8i 2 N:
piðnÞ ¼
X
SDN
jSj!ðjNj  jSj  1Þ!
jNj! ðnðS [ i
 Þ  nðSÞÞ ð5Þ
The Shapley value assigns for each coalition (network in
our case) and to each player his marginal contribution
nðS [ figÞ  nðSÞ where S is a random coalition of agents
preceding i and the ordering is drawn randomly. To
further explain (see Myerson, 1997), suppose players are
picked randomly to enter into a coalition. There are |N|!
different orderings for all players, and for each set S that
does not contain player i there are jSj!ðjNj  jSj  1Þ! ways
to order players so that all of the players in S are picked
ahead of player i. If the orderings are equally likely, there
is a probability of jSj!ðjNj  jSj  1Þ!=jNj! that when player i
is picked he will ﬁnd S players in the coalition already. The
marginal contribution of adding player i to coalition S is
nðS [ figÞ  nðSÞ. Hence, the Shapley value is nothing more
than a marginal (expected) contribution of adding player i
to the coalition. Due to its uniqueness, the concept of the
Shapley value has found numerous applications in
economics and political sciences (Aumann, 1994).
As observed in Ghosh and John (1999) claiming quasi
rents in network is an issue as important as creating it;
several studies suggest that the solution is based on a mix
of observable components and discretionary decisions and
both are based on fair principles.
In our application N is the set of partners, S is the
generic subset of N, n, the characteristic function, is the
value of the business the network wants to undertake and
pi the pay off, is the network n’s portion to assign to
partner i. Let us to consider for sake of simplicity a set N of
three partners (namely A, B and C) that want to join in a
network to carry out an economic initiative. This initiative
should be pursued by different economic actors: indivi-
dually by each partner, by any pair of partners or by all
together; the resulting value will change accordingly. How
should the achieved pay off be shared?
The list of different orderings for all the players is
presented in Table 4 and for each set of S, for example, two
elements that does not contain, for example, A (just one in
the considered case) there are 2 ways to order partners so
Table 3
bP sub-factors assessment r.
Factor Statement Range
bP1 Network arrangement does not allow to improve
product management
[01]
bP2 Network arrangement does not allow to improve
information management
[01]
bP3 Network arrangement does not allow to improve
supply management
[01]
bP4 Network arrangement does not allow to improve
information management
[01]
Table 4
Possible orderings for the set N={A, B, C}.
Ordering number Permutation
O1 ABC
O2 ACB
O3 BAC
O4 BCA
O5 CAB
O6 CBA
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that the partner in S are picked ahead of A (O4 and O6)
and each of them has a probability of 1/3. It is possible to
estimate the marginal contribution of A to the network as
the difference between the value of the network of three
partners and the value of the network whose elements are
B and C. By iterating the procedure for jSj ¼ 1 and S ¼ f|g
the Shapley value can be computed. Therefore the cash
ﬂows and the related cost of capital for each economic
actor considered have to be estimated; the methodology
proposed in the previous section supports in the second
task.
It is possible to calculate the Shapley value for the
three partners; these values are computed basing on the
expected cash ﬂows but, as it is known, these cash ﬂows
are affected by uncertainty then the Shapley value piðnÞ
can support proﬁt sharing decision ﬁxing the percentage
of the effectively achieved proﬁt to assign to the partner i
(PPi).
PPi ¼
piðnÞP
ipiðnÞ
ð6Þ
This modus operandi leads to various advantages that
allow to overcome some drawbacks of alternative meth-
ods used to share pay off. It is a fair and impartial method
that assigns the payoff basing on the individual contribu-
tion. Proﬁt sharing is a crucial aspect in networking
because ﬁrms engage in network because they expect a
quasi rent from their investment (Menard, 2004). More-
over incentive issues can help to disincentive partners
from opportunistic behaviour.
5. Numerical example
Let us introduce a numerical example with explicative
aim. Let us consider the automotive industry for which a
beta value of 1.3 ðbIÞ has been estimated in January 2009 for
the USA market (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/
datasets/betas.xls). Let us suppose that a network of three
ﬁrms (namely A, B and C) can be built to conduct a business.
Using the data reported in Table 5 the beta value for the
network can be calculated using the proposed method
illustrated in Section 3.
These data in a real case should be obtained inter-
viewing managers with a deep knowledge about the
considering network (in the numerical example a 5 points
Likert scale has been adopted for bPi ). Using a threshold
value t equals to 2, the betas factors can be estimated and
the following values are obtained:
bP ¼ 0:625 bR ¼ 1:33 bN ¼ 1:083:
The bN is fundamental to estimate rN that has to be
used to evaluate the NPV for the network (cash ﬂows are
to be estimated and the NPV has to be calculated).
In order to establish the portion of the network pay off
to assign to each partner (A, B and C) the method
proposed in Section 4 can be applied. In Table 6 the
values for the considered characteristic function are
reported: each value represents the NPV related to the
alternative of realising the business for which the network
has been built with the corresponding set of partners (i.e.
if the business would be done by A alone a NPV equals to
h 50  105 should be achieved). Each value is then a NPV
and to calculate it the correct r (opportunity cost of
capital) has to be employed; for the set S=(A,B,C) the value
of r is rN and can be found out using the CAPM with the
value of beta =bN ¼ 1083. In the other cases the method
reported in Section 3 and used above to calculate bN can
be used.
To ﬁnd out PPA,B,C (Eq. (5)) Shapley values for A, B and C
are needed; they can be estimated using Eq. (4). The
possible orderings for the set N={A,B,C} are those reported
in Table 4. Table 7 reported the values of n necessary to
evaluate p(A).
Table 8 shown the values of pðAÞ, pðBÞ, pðCÞ and
PPðAÞ; PPðBÞ; PPðCÞ. As a result the network partners know
that the economic pay off will be shared using the
percentage indicated by PPðAÞ; PPðBÞ; PPðCÞ.
6. Conclusions
Networking is increasingly adopted by ﬁrms to com-
pete in globalized market. In assessing network relation-
ship a critical factor is represented by risk.
Table 5
Input data for the numerical example.
bP1 b
P
2 b
P
3 b
R
1 b
R
2 b
R
3 b
R
4
3 2 5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.4
Table 6
Characteristic function.
S t(S)(105h)
A 50
B 30
C 60
AB 100
AC 120
BC 110
ABC 150
Table 7
Evaluation of p(A).
S t(S[{A}) t(S) Probability (admissible sets)
S=0 u(A)=50 u(|)=0 2
6 ðABCÞ; ðACBÞ
 
S=1 u(BA)=100 u(B)=30 1
6 ðBACÞ
 
u(CA)=120 u(C)=60 1
6 ðCABÞ
 
S=2 u(ABC)=150 u(BC)=110 2
6 ðBCAÞ; ðCBAÞ
 
Table 8
Results for p e PP values.
p(A)(105h) p(B)(105h) p(C)(105h) PP(A) PP(B) PP(C)
51.67 36.67 61.67 34.44% 24.44% 41.11%
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In order to manage network risk it is helpful to
decompose it; often risk managers efforts are not effective
because of the multifaceted consequence of an hedging
action. Therefore, instead of estimate the network risk as a
whole it is fundamental to isolate its components and
highlight the various effects of a decision aiming at
controlling the risk. The risk decomposition has also been
helpful in the risk computation. The paper wants to give a
contribution by suggesting a methodology to compute risk
in network environment. Such methodology encapsulates
the CAPM to assess the cost of capital in ﬁrms networking
investments and it can be customised by varying the sub-
factors considered and it allows to use experts’ experience
to evaluate the risk. Risk and cost of capital estimation is a
preparatory step to tackle with the proﬁt sharing problem.
The proposed methodology is able to ﬁx in a fair way the
percentage of proﬁt to assign to each partner and it allows
to consider the evolution of the network and the double
nature of the risk (opportunity, that is higher cash ﬂows
and, uncertainty, that is higher cost of capital).
Further developments will consider real option theory
in the network value estimation because one of the main
beneﬁts of network solution is its ability to reconﬁgure
itself to undertake new proﬁtable challenges.
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